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Since the bankruptcy of the US investment 
bank Lehman Brothers, Europe has tumbled 
from one crisis into another. The initial 
financial crisis led to an economic crisis and a 
sovereign debt crisis, hitting the eurozone in 
particular. To bring these crises to an end, 
the vicious circle between them needs to be 
broken. 
Policymakers have increasingly come to this 
understanding, as was made clear at the June 
2012 Eurozone Summit. The Summit 
provided the impetus to move towards a 
Banking Union, which implies transferring 
control of the banking sector to the 
European level. This bold step in European 
integration needs to be carefully executed, as 
a flawed design could spark future crises. 
This Policy Brief tries to draw the lessons 
from a previous major step in European 
integration: the creation of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). In its attempt to 
create a Banking Union, the EU risks 
repeating the same mistakes as when it 
designed EMU − even though these mistakes 
are a major cause of current difficulties. 
The mistakes when designing EMU 
In 1992, the EU took one of the most 
important decisions in its integration process. 
By signing the Treaty of Maastricht, Member 
States committed to a markedly closer Union. 
One of the Treaty’s crucial decisions is the 
move towards a common European 
This Policy Brief pleads for an 
unambiguous commitment by 
eurozone leaders to establishing a 
Banking Union that is based on all 
three of its pillars: common 
supervision, a single bank 
resolution authority and a joint 
deposit insurance. There is a clear 
risk that the EU will agree on 
common supervision, but 
subsequently fails to put in place 
the remaining elements of its 
Banking Union. By doing so, the 
EU would make the same mistake 
as when it designed EMU, namely, 
creating a system with built-in 
flaws that risks leading to huge 
costs and a questioning of the 
European project as such. 
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currency, which was to be supported by both 
an economic and a monetary pillar (Delors 
Report, 1989). However, when negotiating 
the Maastricht Treaty, Member States made 
the mistake of pushing through one pillar of 
EMU (monetary union), while not putting in 
place a sufficiently strong second pillar 
(economic union). 
Firm decisions were made on monetary 
union. Member States went beyond fixing 
their exchange rates, as they agreed on an 
ambitious roadmap towards a shared 
currency. The consequence was a single 
European monetary policy for the entire 
monetary union. 
Member States were more reluctant to allow 
for European control of their economic 
policies, as this was considered the heart of 
national sovereignty. Only with regard to 
fiscal policies, some binding rules were 
decided. For macro-economic policymaking, 
European coordination was governed entirely 
by non-binding instruments. Furthermore, 
the EU did not provide for substantive 
solidarity across Member States. Whilst the 
EU’s cohesion policy budget was increased1, 
it could not counterbalance national 
economic shocks. 
Many details of economic union were to be 
decided after the Treaty of Maastricht. Yet, 
after signing the Treaty, there was little 
willingness to set up a strong economic union 
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). Macro-
economic coordination instruments were put 
in place, but they remained non-binding. On 
fiscal matters, more detailed rules were 
worked out in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
                                                 
1 The Cohesion Policy budget approximately 
doubled from 0.2% of EU GDP in 1988 to 0.4% of 
EU GDP in 1993 (House of Lords, 2008). 
However, this is still too small to play a significant 
anti-cyclical role. 
Nonetheless, when the Pact was tested by 
Germany and France in the early 2000s, the 
weak nature of the economic union was 
exposed (Flouzat-Osmont d’Amilly, 2010). 
The consequence of all of this was that the 
EMU was a project with built-in flaws. As 
former Commission President Jacques 
Delors puts it in his memoirs: “Economic and 
Monetary Union walks only on its monetary leg” 
(Delors, 2004: p. 463). 
The weaknesses in the design of the EMU 
have led to huge social costs, and to the 
questioning of the European project as such. 
If European leaders could have predicted 
such events, they would most likely have 
designed another type of EMU. They would 
have opted either for an EMU light, one in 
which Member States retain national control 
over both exchange rates and economic 
policy. Alternatively, they could have opted 
for a genuine EMU, with European control 
over both economic and monetary policies. 
Towards a Banking Union 
Twenty years after signing the Treaty of 
Maastricht, Member States again take a major 
step in European integration by agreeing to 
work towards a closer integrated financial 
framework. Yet, there appears to be a 
substantial gap between the initial rhetoric 
and the actual commitments. 
The three pillars of Banking Union 
While the concept of a European Banking 
Union is rather new, reflection on what 
would be needed to lift supervisory control 
to the European level is not (Goodhart, 2004; 
Verhelst, 2011). In recent discussions, a 
general consensus has emerged about the 
desired scope of a Banking Union (e.g. 
Constâncio, 2012; IMF, 2012 and Pisani-
Ferry et al., 2012). 
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In line with the aim of ensuring a stable 
financial system, a European Banking Union 
should consist of the following three pillars: 
1) European banking supervision 
As of present, each Member State carries out 
its own, national supervision of the banking 
sector. Some mechanisms for cross-border 
coordination have been put in place (i.e. 
colleges of supervisors and the European 
Banking Authority), but supervisory authority 
still resides with the national supervisor. A 
Banking Union would change this set-up by 
transferring supervisory authority to a single 
European supervisor. The hope is that such 
supervision would reduce the temptation to 
favour champions of national banking and 
hide problems from other supervisors. 
2) A common bank resolution authority 
The management of banking crises is 
currently a national competence. As many 
banks operate on a cross-border basis, crisis 
management hence requires coordination 
between Member States. Yet, in the past, 
national capitals have not been able to 
cooperate effectively. An additional problem 
is the fact that Member States, especially the 
smaller ones, cannot credibly bear the huge 
potential costs that are attached to large-scale 
banking crises. In Ireland for instance, the 
banking crisis resulted in the country itself 
losing access to the financial markets. In 
Spain, the same risks manifest themselves. A 
common resolution authority can address 
these problems, as the authority would be 
able to design and apply a cross-border 
strategy for dealing with banking crises. This 
should reduce the need for public money to 
finance bailouts, although the possibility of 
burdening tax payers cannot be fully 
excluded. To be credible, a fiscal backstop is 
therefore needed. This backstop should 
consist of both ex-ante funding and potential 
ex-post financing, the latter through a 
European tax, the European Stability 
Mechanism and/or last resort lending by the 
European Central Bank. 
3) Common deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance protects depositors against 
the failure of a bank. If a bank fails, the 
insurance scheme is to redeem depositors up 
to a predetermined amount. Some European 
harmonisation of deposit insurance schemes 
has taken place, but the schemes are still 
Member State specific. In a Banking Union, 
deposit insurance would instead be lifted to 
the European level. A single scheme would 
then cover the entire Banking Union. As for 
bank resolution, a sufficiently strong fiscal 
backstop is required. 
Each of these three pillars is needed to 
support the Banking Union2. In line with the 
expression “you break it, you own it”, the 
responsibility for banking supervision during 
normal times should be aligned with the 
responsibility for dealing with banking crises 
(i.e. bank resolution and deposit insurance). 
Put otherwise: if supervision fails, the same 
level of government should have to deal with 
the consequences. Transferring only some 
elements to the European level would result 
in a most uneven system, one that would not 
be able to safeguard financial stability3. 
A Banking Union that would transfer crisis 
management and its financing to the 
European level without common supervision 
would lead to so-called moral hazard. 
                                                 
2 It is argued that common deposit insurance is less 
urgent than a common bank resolution authority. 
Nonetheless, the three pillars are deemed of 
importance in the long-term. 
3 This has been referred to as the “Financial 
Trilemma”, in which the combination of financial 
integration and national financial policies is 
incompatible with financial stability (Schoenmaker, 
2011). 
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National supervisors would be tempted to 
underestimate risks in their banking sector, as 
the costs for supervisory failure would after 
all be borne by the wider Banking Union. In 
such a scenario, the European level would – 
rightly so – object to its lack of powers to 
detect burgeoning bank crises. 
Conversely, if crisis management remains 
national and the European level only 
becomes responsible for banking supervision, 
other problems would occur. The European 
supervisor might be tempted to pass the bill 
too quickly to the national level. The national 
level in turn might refuse to bear the costs, as 
it would blame the EU-level for a bank 
failure. Furthermore, investors and 
depositors would still distinguish between 
banks situated in “safe” Member States and 
banks situated in “risky” Member States. Such 
a partial Banking Union would not undo the 
link between banking and sovereign debt 
crises, as Member States would still have to 
pay the bill if a banking crisis occurred. 
The Commission proposal 
In contrast to the widely accepted idea of a 
three pillar Banking Union, the Commission 
proposal of September 2012 focuses on only 
one pillar: common supervision. It suggests a 
gradual move towards a single supervisory 
mechanism for the eurozone (possibly also 
including other Member States). Under the 
proposal, the ECB can decide to take over 
supervision of specific banks from January 
2013 onwards, focusing on banks that have 
received public financial assistance. In July 
2013, the ECB would then become the 
responsible supervisor for the largest, 
systemic banks. In 2014, the process would 
be completed by making the ECB 
responsible for the supervision of all banks in 
the eurozone. The Commission proposal 
would hence result in firmly putting in place 
the supervisory pillar of the Banking Union 
(Commission, 2012a). 
However, the Commission is much less 
detailed about the two other pillars of the 
Banking Union. In the short-term, the 
institution calls on Member States to agree 
on earlier proposals on crisis resolution and 
deposit insurance. Yet, these proposals 
remain stuck in a national logic, as no 
responsibilities would be transferred to the 
European level. In the longer term, the 
Commission promises to make a proposal on 
a “single resolution mechanism” for bank crises, 
falling short of proposing a single resolution 
authority. It furthermore made no 
commitments on working towards a 
common deposit insurance (Commission, 
2012b). This would be insufficient to attain a 
sustainable Banking Union4. 
It seems as though the Commission’s 
proposal remains deliberately vague on the 
final scope of the European Banking Union, 
due to political reasons. By working first 
towards common supervision, the 
Commission hopes to create the momentum 
to move ahead on a common bank resolution 
authority and common deposit insurance at a 
later stage. This way, it would create a 
Banking Union by stealth. 
Repeating the mistakes of the EMU 
design? 
By postponing essential decisions on two out 
of the three pillars of a Banking Union, the 
EU risks making the same mistake as when it 
                                                 
4 In previous statements on a Banking Union, the 
Commission was clearer on the need for a 
comprehensive approach. This underlines the 
institution’s backtracking in its September 2012 
proposal and the accompanying roadmap. See the 
Memos by the Commission on Banking Union of 6 
and 22 June 2012. 
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decided to create an EMU. If the flaws in the 
design of the EMU teach us one thing, it is 
that ambitious integration projects should be 
put in place in a coordinated manner. 
Europe can, in the words of Robert 
Schuman, “be built through concrete achievements” 
(Schuman, 1950). However, the success of 
these achievements should not fully depend 
on hypothetical future actions. The monetary 
union was not sustainable because it was not 
backed by a sufficiently strong economic 
union. In the same vein, common 
supervision risks failure if it is not backed by 
common responsibility for bank crises. As 
discussed above, a Banking Union needs all 
three pillars in order to be viable. There is a 
clear risk that the EU will agree on common 
supervision, but subsequently fails to put in 
place the remaining elements of its Banking 
Union. 
The only way to avoid the risk of having an 
unstable Banking Union is to provide 
sufficient clarity on the road ahead. 
Therefore, the EU needs to be clear on the 
final objectives of a Banking Union, instead 
of trying to move by stealth. The objective 
could be either to move towards a genuine 
Banking Union, with common responsibility 
both in normal times and during crises, or, 
alternatively, the EU could choose to leave 
banking supervision and crisis management 
at the national level. As for the EMU, these 
two options are to be preferred over any half-
way solution. 
Conclusion: In need of clear, high-
level commitment 
The EU and its institutions deserve credit for 
taking the bold decision to move towards a 
Banking Union. Nonetheless, while Member 
States embraced the concept of a Banking 
Union, they still have difficulties with the 
transfer of sovereignty and the potential fiscal 
consequences it entails. There is a tendency 
to postpone discussions on these sensitive 
issues. However, as the EMU has shown, 
executing such a crucial step in European 
integration requires foreseeing all necessary 
elements from the start. 
It is, of course, not possible to agree on all 
characteristics at the same time. A gradual 
move towards a Banking Union can be 
envisaged, leaving certain non-essential 
options open for now. Nevertheless, a clear 
joint political commitment with regard to the 
general outline of the future Banking Union 
should precede any legal decisions. 
Therefore, eurozone leaders should adopt a 
resolution in which they confirm the desire to 
establish common supervision, a single bank 
resolution authority and common deposit 
insurance, as well as a strong fiscal backstop 
that makes the project credible.  
Only by being clear about what it aims to 
achieve, will the EU be able to convince 
citizens and financial markets that it is serious 
about creating a Banking Union. By doing so, 
European leaders would take a crucial step 
towards tackling the ongoing sovereign debt 
crisis, and undoing the EMU’s birth defects. 
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